In a radical reimagining of Ghana’s governance architecture, the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) has proposed a fundamental unbundling of executive power, transforming the Council of State from a quiet advisory body into a formidable constitutional gatekeeper.
Presenting the committee’s final report to President John Dramani Mahama, the Committee Chaired by Professor Henry Kwasi Prempeh argued that the current 1992 arrangement – where the Council offers “non-binding” advice – has failed to provide the necessary checks on the “Imperial Presidency.”
The report rejects calls to abolish the Council or turn it into a second parliamentary chamber. Instead, it seeks to return the institution to its 1969 “co-guarantor” roots, granting it binding recruitment and vetting powers over the nation’s most sensitive independent offices.
“The Committee believes that the case for retaining the Council of State remains strong, so long as it is substantially restructured in purpose, composition, impact, and transparency. In particular, a Council of State that returns to the role envisioned for it under the 1969 Constitution”
Constitutional Review Committee
Under the proposed 33-member structure, the President would no longer handpick the heads of the Electoral Commission, the Judiciary, or the Auditor-General; he would merely appoint from a list of candidates vetted and submitted by a newly empowered Council.
The CRC proposes to facilitate the “depoliticization” of the Fourth Branch of government. For years, Ghanaian politics has centered on the perception that the President’s power to appoint commissioners and judges creates a bias.
Prof. Prempeh’s committee seeks to break this cycle by giving the Council of State the mandate to recruit, vet, and make binding nominations for the Chief Justice, the EC Commissioner, and the heads of the proposed Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission.
By transferring these powers, the CRC aims to insulate state institutions from the immediate whims of the Jubilee House, with the Council Of State effectively acting as a “Recruitment and Vetting Machine,” – ensuring that those who lead the nation’s accountability institutions are chosen based on professional merit rather than political loyalty.
Reconstituting the Council
To ensure this new power is not merely a different flavor of patronage, the CRC has proposed a drastic composition reset. The new 33-member Council would be a blend of Ex-Officeholders, Interest Group Nominees, and Regional Representatives.
Crucially, the committee recommended excluding the immediate past occupants of high offices – such as the immediate past President or Chief Justice – to prevent the Council from becoming a “shadow cabinet” for the previous administration.
According to the CRC, the introduction of nominees from Organized Labour, Academia, Civil Society, and Professional Associations ensures that the Council reflects the diverse technical and moral fiber of the nation. These interest groups would choose their representatives through a democratic process, removing the President’s ability to stack the Council with loyalists.
“The Council shall recruit, vet, and make binding nominations – for appointment to vacancies in the independent and ‘hybrid-independent’ constitutional and statutory offices.
“The Council of State shall play no role in appointments to vacancies on the governing boards of state-owned enterprises, as it is proposed that appointments to such governing councils shall be made in accordance with the advice of a proposed ‘constitutionalised SIGA’”
Constitutional Review Committee
Yet in the midst of these proposed changes, perhaps the most significant expansion of the Council’s mandate is its new role in the removal of independent constitutional officeholders.
With the current process for removing an EC Commissioner or the Chief Justice often criticized as being either too cumbersome or too easily politicized, the CRC proposed that the Council of State becomes the primary receiver of sworn petitions for removal.
“The Council will receive written petition(s) for the removal of an identified independent constitutional officeholder – determine if the petition(s) on the face of it alleges facts and grounds sufficient to warrant further investigation. If so, set up an independent tribunal to investigate and make appropriate findings and recommendations to the Council for onward transmission to the President for obligatory action”
Constitutional Review Committee
According to the proposal, this turns the Council into a “disciplinary gatekeeper,” ensuring that the removal of high-ranking officials is based on proven misconduct rather than political convenience.
Transparency Pivot
To address the longstanding criticism that the Council of State is a “secret society,” of the elite, Prof. Prempeh mandated a “Transparency Pivot.”
While meetings will still be held in camera to allow for frank discussion, the record of all decisions, advice, and recommendations by the Council must be made public. The Council would also be required to submit and publish an annual report to Parliament, making its influence on the presidency a matter of public record.
This move toward fit and proper standards – including a strict 30-to-80-year age limit and a ban on active politics while serving – is intended to restore the public’s trust in the institutions of accountability nationwide.
