More than 5,000 people have fled northeastern Nigeria into Cameroon after Boko Haram militants stormed the border town of Kirawa in Borno State, residents and community leaders confirmed on Friday. The attack has left the community deserted, underscoring the persistent threat of insurgent groups in the region.
Borno, long regarded as the epicentre of a 16-year conflict involving Boko Haram and its splinter faction, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), has witnessed a sharp rise in attacks this year. Both civilians and security forces have come under increasing assault, with insurgents seizing army bases and local communities before being pushed back by military reinforcements.
The latest attack on Thursday night forced district head Abdulrahman Abubakar to abandon his palace, which was set ablaze alongside a military barracks and dozens of homes. “I was left with no option but to flee to Cameroon,” Abubakar said. “Residents boarded trucks to seek refuge across the border, while others ran to Maiduguri,” the state capital.
Boko Haram quickly claimed responsibility for the assault, releasing a video showing fighters torching the barracks while chanting “victory belongs to God” as flames lit up the night.
Residents confirmed that Kirawa has been entirely abandoned. “Boko Haram is in control,” said Dauda Hassan, who managed to escape to Pulka, a nearby town guarded by troops.
The assault followed a September 19 attack on Banki, another border town, where Boko Haram fighters overran a military barracks, forcing soldiers to retreat while looting weapons.
Yakubu Mabba Ali Kirawa, head of the town’s development association, issued an urgent call for military reinforcements. He revealed that local vigilantes and residents are now the only security presence after a multinational task force withdrew in August following an earlier attack.
Regional Campaigns Struggle To Contain Insurgency
Boko Haram, founded in 2002, remains a formidable challenge not only to Nigeria but to the wider Lake Chad Basin. Despite years of military campaigns, the group continues to mount significant offensives, exposing the complexity of dismantling its networks.
The Nigerian government, in partnership with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, has repeatedly launched military operations designed to weaken the insurgency. These efforts have included airstrikes, ground assaults, and improved intelligence sharing. Nigerian troops have reclaimed several key towns once under Boko Haram control, degrading parts of the group’s structure. International partners, including the United States and France, have supported these operations with training and equipment, strengthening regional counterterrorism efforts.
Yet, Boko Haram has proven highly adaptive. Its fighters alternate between conventional attacks and guerrilla-style ambushes, exploiting Nigeria’s porous borders and the challenging terrain of the Sambisa Forest. These tactics allow insurgents to create safe havens and evade prolonged military pressure.
Socioeconomic grievances continue to fuel the insurgency. Chronic poverty, unemployment, and political marginalization in northeastern Nigeria provide fertile ground for Boko Haram’s recruitment strategies. Local communities, often trapped between the militants and government forces, face intimidation and hardship, complicating intelligence gathering and deepening distrust toward authorities.
Factionalism has further complicated the conflict. Internal divisions within Boko Haram, including splinter groups aligned with ISIS, have intensified violence while fracturing the insurgency’s leadership structure. This fragmentation has made negotiations more elusive and unified military responses more difficult to achieve.
The Nigerian government has made gains through military campaigns and international partnerships. However, observers warn that security measures alone will not be enough. Addressing the underlying socioeconomic conditions that fuel extremism is critical to building a durable peace.
The Kirawa attack highlights both the resilience of Boko Haram and the limits of a military-first strategy. Until poverty, political exclusion, and the radicalization of youth are tackled alongside robust security operations, the threat is likely to persist.
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