The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamic State-aligned insurgent group operating in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is increasingly financing its operations through gold mining and smuggling, allowing it to sustain its campaign despite years of military pressure and disruptions to external funding networks.
A report by US-based investigative organisation The Sentry estimates that the group generates between US$1 million and US$1.6 million annually from gold mining sites in the Manguredjipa area of North Kivu province alone.
The gold is trafficked through trading hubs in eastern Congo before reaching refiners and export networks in neighbouring Uganda, embedding the insurgency within regional commercial networks that continue to operate despite joint military efforts to defeat the group.
The ADF, which has killed thousands of civilians and security personnel over the past decade, has also generated revenue through cocoa production, extortion and kidnapping, according to the report.
According to Justyna Gudzowska, Executive Director of The Sentry, “the ADF has adapted to military pressure and sanctions by finding new ways to fund its operations, particularly through gold and other resource trafficking.”
She called on governments to disrupt the networks sustaining the group, adding: “That means going after the financiers, gold traders, and facilitators.”
Meanwhile, the group’s gold operations rely on networks connecting remote mining areas to traders, transporters and intermediaries operating across rural communities and urban trading centres.
Gold moves through eastern Congo’s commercial hubs before entering regional supply chains linked to buyers, refiners and export networks in Uganda. This cross-border trade allows the ADF to convert mineral resources into funds that support its operations.
A representative of a Congolese mining cooperative reported earlier that the group moved into the area in mid-2024 and established bases near mining sites.
According to The Sentry, ADF makes money from kidnapping, extortion, and the manufacturing of cocoa in addition to gold. In addition to providing manpower and recruits, abductions strengthen the group’s capacity to continue operating in mining regions and nearby villages.
Reduced Islamic State Funding Fails to Weaken Insurgency
The ADF’s growing reliance on locally generated revenue follows disruptions to financial networks linked to the Islamic State in late 2024, when US sanctions targeted key facilitators.
Established as an Islamist group in Uganda in the 1990s, the ADF shifted most of its operations to eastern Congo by 2000 before pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in 2019. Its relationship with the organisation provided access to external support and reinforced its transnational jihadist ambitions.
However, The Sentry’s findings indicate that the group has increasingly turned to domestic resource mobilisation as financial channels linked to the Islamic State have weakened.
The shift has reduced its dependence on external support and increased the importance of commercial networks connecting mineral-rich areas of eastern Congo to regional markets.
The ADF has also demonstrated an ability to adapt its operations in response to sustained military pressure. Joint Congolese-Ugandan operations launched in late 2021 helped secure major cities and trade routes, but the group has fragmented rather than been defeated.
According to The Sentry, insurgents have moved deeper into remote mining areas across North Kivu, Ituri and Tshopo, where dispersed units can continue operating along forested corridors and exploit access to valuable natural resources.
The investigation estimates that, as of February 2026, the ADF maintained approximately 600 to 700 combatants and around 2,000 dependents, distributed between areas around Manguredjipa in North Kivu and Mambasa in Ituri.
The group has continued to conduct attacks on civilians despite offensives by the Armed Forces of the DRC and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces. Its dispersed structure allows smaller units to remain active while military operations target other positions.
The report also places the insurgency within eastern Congo’s wider security crisis, where the Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion, now referred to in the supplied material as FRN, has drawn considerable military and political attention.
The Sentry found no conclusive evidence of direct operational collaboration between the ADF and M23 or its regional supporters.
However, the report noted that competing security pressures and fragmented areas of control have created conditions that the ADF can exploit to sustain its activities.
Cross-Border Networks Complicate Efforts to Defeat ADF
Meanwhile, the continued movement of gold from eastern Congo into regional markets presents a significant challenge for efforts to cut off the ADF’s funding.
Uganda has deployed thousands of troops to eastern Congo to help local forces combat the insurgency, but the ADF has remained resilient by embedding itself within local economic networks and relocating to remote, resource-rich areas.
The Sentry’s investigation raises concerns about the overlap between Uganda’s military presence and its economic interests in eastern Congo, including regional trade routes, infrastructure and resource flows.
Although Operation Shujaa, the joint Ugandan-Congolese campaign against the ADF, has pushed the group away from parts of the Ugandan border, the insurgents have adapted by dispersing into other areas while continuing to attack civilians.
Gold and other commodities continue to move towards regional markets through trading centres and transport corridors, including the Beni-Kasindi route and Butembo in North Kivu.
The Sentry reported that some residents of eastern Congo believe the continued ADF threat provides justification for Uganda’s long-term security and economic presence in strategically important parts of the country.
The report argues that ADF’s resilience stems from its ability to operate within a fragmented conflict economy rather than relying solely on territorial control or external alliances.
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