IMANI Centre for Policy and Education has urged the Government of Ghana to halt any move toward acquiring Springfield Exploration and Production Limited’s Afina oil discovery, warning that such a transaction—without thorough, regulator-supervised appraisal—could expose the state to severe financial, technical, and governance risks.
In a detailed analysis of the ongoing discussions surrounding the Afina block, IMANI insisted that the only credible first step is to “design, fund, and execute a robust appraisal program to gather rigorous data,” cautioning that anything short of this would amount to gambling with the public purse.
The think tank’s concerns come in the wake of renewed national debate after indications that government is considering an outright purchase of the Afina asset.
This shift follows the February 2025 announcement by the Minister for Energy, John Jinapor, confirming Ghana’s withdrawal from the controversial forced unitisation directive issued in April 2020 by the previous administration.
That directive had sought to merge ENI and Vitol’s producing Sankofa field—developed at nearly US$7 billion—with Springfield’s unproven Afina discovery and transfer majority ownership of the combined field to Springfield.
IMANI described the earlier directive as “plainly absurd,” praising the new minister for rejecting a policy that they argue would have undermined investor confidence and exposed Ghana to legal and financial vulnerabilities.
However, the organisation now fears that the government may bend to pressure from “powerful people who held sway over the previous administration,” whose lobbying efforts, IMANI says, are aimed at keeping alive the same flawed commercial logic behind the forced unitisation.
According to the think tank, early signals that the state may be exploring a full acquisition of Afina “worry us because it could open the door for a capitulation to lobbyists and backroom dealers.”
“Afina remains a high-uncertainty asset. It is essentially a one-well discovery with long-delayed appraisal, fragmented testing history, and contested resource estimates.
“The absence of consistent, transparent, regulator-validated data makes any attempt to fix a reliable commercial value inherently speculative and vulnerable to political influence”.
IMANI Centre for Policy and Education
Unvalidated Claims
According to IMANI, Springfield’s earlier claim of more than one billion barrels of recoverable oil has never been validated through a comprehensive appraisal program overseen by the Petroleum Commission.
Instead, there are “contradictory interpretations” from ENI, GNPC, and independent analysts, all suggesting that technical ambiguity remains deep—and unresolved. “In simple terms, the block could be worthless,” IMANI cautioned.
The organisation stressed that meaningful assessment of Afina’s commercial viability cannot rely on Springfield’s own data. IMANI rejected as “untenable” the minister’s suggestion that a review of Springfield’s data could form the basis for a possible acquisition.
“Determining the commercial viability of the block would likely involve significant new investment under an arrangement controlled by the government as a lender.
“GNPC’s exploration of a state-led acquisition based on limited data collected by Springfield risks converting private corporate risk into public fiscal liability”.
IMANI Centre for Policy and Education
Springfield’s Financial Challenges
IMANI also highlighted Springfield’s financial challenges—its debt exposure and legal dispute with Swiss commodities trader Petraco—as cautionary signals. The company that drilled the only well in the Afina block, the organisation noted, has already won arbitration proceedings against Springfield due to non-payment of its drilling bills.
These issues, IMANI suggested, call into question what “serious investments” Springfield has made in Afina and why it should hold leverage in dictating commercial terms.
Public assurances from GNPC that it did not endorse an earlier US$700 million valuation of Afina provided minimal comfort to IMANI, which argued that the broader valuation environment remains compromised as long as it depends on data filtered by Springfield.
According to the think tank, analysts have consistently warned that Afina’s commerciality remains unproven and that previous valuation estimates reflected “optimism bias and weak regulatory oversight.”
The organisation acknowledged that the government’s evolving stance under Minister Jinapor reflects “greater restraint and technical caution,” particularly his commitment to securing an independent expert valuation before taking any further steps.
However, IMANI stressed that independence alone is insufficient: “There has simply not been sufficient appraisal to collect enough serious data for any valuer to work with.”
Funding Through Convertible Loan
In outlining a safer alternative approach, IMANI argued that Ghana already holds equity in the Afina block through Explorco and GNPC and could therefore provide funding to support additional appraisal activities without pursuing an outright acquisition.
Such funding, they recommended, could take the form of a convertible loan, giving the state the option to secure additional equity—possibly a controlling stake—once the asset is de-risked, while compelling Springfield to bring in viable commercial partners. If Springfield is unable to do so, IMANI noted, it would indicate the block’s lack of commercial prospects.
For IMANI, the governance and regulatory framework around Afina is just as important as its geotechnical uncertainties. The think tank insisted that civil society must have “a full seat at the table” in designing and supervising the appraisal and valuation processes to restore public confidence, given the opaque history of the Afina block.
They emphasised that GNPC faces a “structural conflict of interest” and cannot serve simultaneously as buyer, technical assessor, and quasi-regulator. The Petroleum Commission, IMANI argued, must assert its role as the primary technical authority, with unrestricted access to raw data and insulation from political interference.
The organisation also warned that Ghana’s current macroeconomic context—marked by debt restructuring, fiscal consolidation, and compliance with IMF benchmarks—renders any large upstream acquisition “particularly risky and unwise.”
IMANI cautioned that diverting scarce capital into a high-uncertainty asset like Afina could crowd out more economically sound investments, including those in proven gas infrastructure and other critical energy projects.
Drawing parallels with global experiences, IMANI pointed to best practices in countries such as Norway, the UK, and Canada, where unitisation and asset transfers rely on transparent data-sharing and strong regulatory independence.
The organisation contrasted this with cautionary examples from Brazil and Nigeria, where state oil companies were saddled with politically driven acquisitions that ultimately led to inefficiency, corruption risks, and value destruction.
IMANI concluded that any state acquisition of Afina must be treated as a last resort and must be rigorously safeguarded: it should be ring-fenced from non-Afina liabilities, backed by double-blind technical reviews, and subjected to parliamentary and civil society scrutiny before approval.
“But even these safeguards are not the first step. The first step is to design, fund, and execute a robust appraisal program.”
IMANI Centre for Policy and Education
Anything less, the think tank warned, would reward weak corporate governance, shift speculative private risk onto the taxpayer, and set a dangerous precedent for distressed oil companies to seek state bailouts disguised as strategic national interests.
For IMANI, the Afina controversy is not simply about petroleum—it is a test of Ghana’s commitment to prudent governance and protection of the public purse.
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