Policy think-tank IMANI Center for Policy and Education has renewed calls for an end to the long-standing practice of allocating a portion of the District Assemblies Common Fund to Members of Parliament, describing the arrangement as a constitutional overreach that undermines Ghana’s decentralization framework.
In a detailed policy brief, IMANI argued that although the MPs’ share has become normalized over the years, it lacks a firm legal grounding and weakens accountability at the local government level.
The DACF is one of the most critical fiscal mechanisms established under Ghana’s Fourth Republic. It was designed to ensure that development at the district level is guaranteed by the Constitution rather than subject to political discretion.
IMANI stressed that any deviation from this constitutional intent risks distorting the balance of power between national and local governance structures.
“While often defended as a necessary tool for constituency development, a closer look at the 1992 Constitution and the mechanics of this MP’s Share reveals a profound tension between political convenience and constitutional fidelity.”
IMANI Center for Policy and Education
At the center of IMANI’s argument is Article 252 of the 1992 Constitution, which mandates that at least five percent of total national revenue be distributed among District Assemblies.
According to the think-tank, the wording of this provision is clear and deliberate as it assigns the fund solely to local government authorities and makes no reference to Members of Parliament or any other political office holders as beneficiaries. IMANI maintains that constitutional interpretation must begin with the plain meaning of the text.
“As noted in the 1992 Constitution, if the framers had intended to create a parallel development channel for legislators, they would have explicitly stated so.
“This textual clarity is reinforced by the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936), which designates Assemblies and not individual legislators as the highest political and administrative authorities at the local level.”
IMANI Center for Policy and Education
Allowing MPs to influence or direct DACF spending, IMANI said, blurs the constitutional distinction between the legislature and the executive arms of government.
Origins in Political Compromise
IMANI traced the MPs’ share of the DACF not to constitutional reform, but to political bargaining in the late 1990s. The practice emerged in 1997 as part of negotiations between Parliament and the executive over approval of the DACF distribution formula.
According to IMANI, former Local Government Minister Kwamena Ahwoi has previously explained that parliamentary leaders threatened to block the formula unless MPs were granted a portion of the fund.
For IMANI, this history matters. It suggests that the MPs’ share was a concession to political pressure rather than a policy innovation grounded in decentralization principles. Over time, the arrangement has taken on an appearance of legitimacy, even though it was never anchored in constitutional amendment or broad public consultation.
“Furthermore, as Suhuyini, Antwi-Boasiako, and Abdul-Rashid (2023) highlight, this has created a “perception meets practice” gap where many citizens wrongly believe these funds are deposited into MPs’ personal accounts, leading to a culture where constituents chase their MPs for individual financial favours and developmental projects rather than their local government and MMDCEs”.
IMANI Center for Policy and Education
This perception diverts attention from assemblies and local executives who are constitutionally responsible for development planning and service delivery.
According to the brief, this dynamic fuels clientelism and weakens participatory local governance. Instead of holding assemblies accountable through formal channels, citizens are encouraged to seek favors from individual MPs, reinforcing a culture that prioritizes political access over institutional processes.
This, the think tank argues, also creates confusion over who is accountable for development outcomes. When projects succeed, credit is often claimed by MPs. When they fail, responsibility is frequently shifted to assemblies. This ambiguity weakens institutional accountability and erodes public trust in local governance.
IMANI warned that the arrangement also compromises Parliament’s oversight role, since MPs who are involved in implementing projects may find it difficult to impartially scrutinize district spending.
A Constitutionally Sound Alternative
IMANI argued that reforming the DACF does not require sidelining MPs from constituency development. Rather, it called for a disciplined return to the original constitutional design.
Under its proposed approach, one hundred percent of DACF resources would be allocated directly to Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies, as required by Article 252.
MPs would continue to play a critical role as advocates for their constituencies by proposing projects and priorities that must be integrated into approved district development plans. Implementation would remain firmly within assembly structures, with clear reporting and oversight mechanisms.
IMANI believes this model preserves political responsiveness while restoring constitutional clarity. The think-tank concluded that the debate over the MPs’ share of the DACF raises a deeper question about Ghana’s commitment to the rule of law.
In a constitutional democracy, IMANI argued, practices rooted in political convenience should not override clear constitutional provisions. Ending the MPs’ share, the brief emphasizes, is not about diminishing the relevance of legislators.
It is about strengthening decentralization, protecting institutional integrity, and ensuring that local development is driven by transparent and accountable systems. For IMANI, stopping what it calls a legal overreach is a necessary step toward reinforcing the foundations of Ghana’s constitutional order.
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