Jerome Kwaku Sam, the Public Affairs Manager for the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), has revealed that a staggering procurement failure at the COCOBOD has left millions of dollars’ worth of agricultural equipment rotting in warehouses, following realisations that the tools were “not fit for purpose.”
The Public Affairs Manager exposed a crisis involving motorized slashers, pruning machines, and automatic scaling units – equipment intended to modernize the cocoa sector but which has instead become a symbol of administrative negligence.
“The farmers have vehemently rejected the use of these machines, reason being that it is not fit for purpose – they cannot use them because of the heaviness of the machine. They have to fix it at their back in order for them to work with it, but it is so heavy to the extent that no farmer can use it”
Jerome Kwaku Sam, Public Affairs Manager for COCOBOD
The disclosure, centered on a massive dump site at the Bonsu warehouse, highlighted a deep-seated disconnect between the “Cocoa House,” bureaucracy and the actual physical demands of the farmers they serve.
According to Mr. Sam, the equipment in question was procured during the 2019/2020 cycle under a “brilliant” theoretical framework designed to solve two major industry problems: the backbreaking labor of manual weeding and the systemic cheating of farmers by Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs).
However, five years later, the motorized slashers and pruning machines have been vehemently rejected by the very farmers they were meant to assist, turning a modernization drive into a costly logistical nightmare.

The Blunder
The crisis is twofold. While the slashers and pruners suffer from ergonomic failure, the automatic scaling machines represent a massive financial default.
Mr. Sam noted that COCOBOD had introduced the electronic scales to replace manual ones, which farmers complained were being adjusted by LBC clerks to under-weigh their produce. The arrangement was that COCOBOD would pay for the machines upfront, with the LBCs reimbursing the board through deductions from their operational margins.
Years later, it has emerged that several LBCs have failed to honor this agreement. Instead of the scales being paid for by the private sector partners, the financial burden has been shifted entirely onto COCOBOD.
This represents a direct hit to the “cocoa farmers’ money,” as the board is forced to absorb the costs of equipment that was supposed to be self-financing. The lack of debt recovery mechanisms within the original contract has left the current Administration scrambling to account for a massive hole in its technical budget.
With regards to the slashers and pruning machines, the most visible sign of its failure is at the Bonsu warehouse, where “chunks” have been abandoned for over half a decade.
Jerome Kwaku Sam noted that because the previous management failed to act when the initial rejections by farmers began, the opportunity to return the equipment or renegotiate with the manufacturers has long passed.
The motorized units, which require precision maintenance and specific storage conditions, are now likely beyond repair, effectively turning a hundred-million-dollar-plus investment into scrap metal. For Mr. Sam, this “dumping” of technology underscores a critical failure in stakeholder consultation.

“This clearly shows that no consultation whatsoever was made because if the farmer extensively was consulted they would have given specification as to how the machine should be made or the type of machine that they needed for their farming activities. Somebody just sat at Cocoa House and decided that this is what a farmer needs”
Jerome Kwaku Sam, Public Affairs Manager for COCOBOD
He insisted that if the farmers – the ultimate end-users – had been contacted on the technical specifications, the issue of weight and ergonomics would have been identified before a single unit was purchased. He lamented that the decision was made in a vacuum at the head office, ignoring the lived reality of the Ghanaian farmer who must navigate difficult terrain while carrying heavy machinery.
Road to Reform
The current leadership at COCOBOD is now using this failure as a case study for why a radical shift in agriculture management is necessary. The CEO, Dr. Ransford Abbey has spent the last year highlighting these legacy debts and procurement errors to emphasize the need for “evidence-based” policy making.
For the board, no amount of Industrialization or mechanization can succeed if it is not grounded in the technical realities of the field. It is now looking at how to salvage any value from the abandoned units, though the prospects remain dim.
The “Scaling Machine,” scandal, meanwhile, has triggered calls for a stricter regulatory framework for LBCs. Industry analysts suggest that the failure of LBCs to pay for the equipment they used to facilitate their own business should be met with license revocations or heavy penalties.

COCOBOD’s current stance is one of transparency, exposing these past errors to ensure they are not repeated as the board looks toward the 2026/2027 season. The focus must return to the farmer’s welfare, ensuring that every cedi spent on technology actually reaches the farmgate in a usable form.
As the dust settles on the Bonsu warehouse revelations, the financial implications of this and other challenges over the last couple of years continue to reverberate through the sector. Moving forward, COCOBOD has signaled that all future procurement will involve rigorous field testing and farmer-led feedback loops.
The goal is to ensure that the next wave of Industrialization in the cocoa sector is not just “brilliant” on paper, but effective in the hands of the men and women who sustain the nation’s economy.
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