Ofoase-Ayirebi Member of Parliament Kojo Oppong Nkrumah has sued the Chief Justice at the Supreme Court, asking the court to declare unconstitutional the warrants directing judges to sit and conduct criminal trials in selected cases during the legal vacation.
The writ, filed on 14 August 2026 and numbered J1/29/2026, names the Chief Justice as first defendant and the Attorney-General as second. Oppong Nkrumah invokes the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution and Rule 45 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996.
His central complaint is selectivity, arguing that facilitating the hearing of special criminal cases while other criminal matters wait amounts to selective justice, and he asks the court to strike down the rule that permits the practice. The writ opens with a challenge to the warrants themselves.
Oppong Nkrumah asks for a declaration that the warrants of the Chief Justice directing some judges to sit and conduct criminal trials in selected cases during the legal vacation are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of Articles 17(1), 17(2), 23 and 296(a) and (b) of the Constitution, and therefore unconstitutional, null and void.
Article 17 guarantees equality before the law and freedom from discrimination. Article 23 requires administrative bodies to act fairly and reasonably. Article 296 governs the exercise of discretionary power.
The second relief sharpens the argument from procedure to purpose. The MP asks the court to declare that the action of the Chief Justice in promoting and facilitating the hearing of “special criminal cases” in the legal vacation, to the total neglect of other criminal cases, is tantamount to selective justice which contravenes the letter and spirit of Article 17(1).
The claim is not that vacation sittings are unlawful in themselves. It is that choosing which cases proceed, while leaving every other criminal matter to wait until the courts resume, treats accused persons unequally on a basis the Constitution does not permit.
That framing puts the burden on the criteria rather than the calendar. A litigant whose trial continues through August and September receives a different service from the courts than one whose trial does not, and the writ asks what principle governs that distinction.
A right to health claim for lawyers and staff
The third relief opens a line of argument that has not featured in the public debate so far. Oppong Nkrumah asks the court to declare that the warrants violate the right to health of members of the Bar and judicial service affected by the directive, and are inconsistent with Articles 24(1), 24(2) and 36(10) of the Constitution.
Article 24 protects the right to work under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions, and guarantees rest, leisure and reasonable working hours. Article 36(10) requires the State to safeguard the health, safety and welfare of persons in employment.
The claim converts what the Ghana Bar Association framed as an appeal for consideration into a constitutional entitlement. Where the Association asked the Chief Justice to take counsel’s unavailability into account, the writ asserts that requiring lawyers and court staff to work through the vacation infringes rights the Constitution guarantees.
Order 79 itself under challenge
The fourth relief reaches past the warrants to the rule that authorises them.
Oppong Nkrumah asks the court to declare that Order 79 Rules 1(1) and 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004, to the extent that they allow the Chief Justice to select some cases for hearing during legal vacations in the same manner as ordinary court sittings, are inconsistent with Articles 17(1), 17(2), 23, 24(1), 24(2), 36(10) and 296(a) and (b), and therefore unconstitutional, null and void.
That is the most consequential prayer in the writ. Deputy Attorney-General Dr Justice Srem-Sai and other defenders of the warrants have rested their case on Order 79, arguing that the vacation schedule in Rule 4 is expressly subject to the Chief Justice’s power under Rule 1(1) to appoint any day for hearings.
The suit accepts that reading of the rule and attacks the rule itself. The writ closes by asking for any other orders the court considers appropriate to give effect to the declarations sought.
The capacity in which he sues
Oppong Nkrumah states that he brings the action as a citizen of Ghana, a Member of Parliament and a lawyer. His address for service is care of Davies & Davis at LawTowers, East Airport, Accra.
The citizen capacity matters procedurally. Article 2(1) allows any person to bring an action alleging that an enactment or act is inconsistent with the Constitution, which means he does not need to show personal injury to maintain the suit.
The suit follows an exchange that began on 10 August, when the Ghana Bar Association wrote to the Chief Justice after three law firms received notices requiring their lawyers to appear before judges designated to continue part-heard criminal cases during the vacation.
Chief Justice Paul Baffoe-Bonnie answered publicly in Sunyani, saying a judge who is sitting and ready cannot be stopped because counsel has made other arrangements, and describing adjournment as a judicial act belonging to the trial judge.
Dr Srem-Sai argued that no convention overrides the express provision of Order 79, and Presidential Aide Joyce Bawah Mogtari questioned the Bar’s motives.
The defendants have fourteen days after service of the statement of the plaintiff’s case to file their own. The Chief Justice, who heads the court that will hear the matter, is the first defendant in a suit challenging the exercise of his own administrative discretion.
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